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The Effects of Voluntary Return Programmes on Migration Flows 
in the Context of the 1973/74 and 2008/09 Economic Crises
Piotr Plewa
Abstract: The article analyses Spain’s voluntary return policies, including the pro-
gramme instituted specifi cally to assist migrants affected by the 2008/09 crisis. Vol-
untary return policies were implemented in Europe in the context of the 1973/4 
crisis. Just like the Western European programmes of the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
current Spanish voluntary return policies also only elicited the cooperation of small 
numbers of migrants and countries of origin. The article recommends four broader 
policy measures to tackle the emerging trend whereby a considerable proportion of 
migrants will stay in Spain rather than repatriate. 
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1 Introduction
On 11 November 2008 Spain authorised redundant migrant workers to collect their 
unemployment benefi ts in a lump sum and obtain a free return ticket home, alleg-
edly to shield them from the recession. The objective of this study is to assess under 
which conditions Spain’s voluntary return policies (VRPs) have been able to reverse 
the process of unsustainable, precarious job-based growth while balancing the in-
terests of Spain with those of the countries of origin. Given the sparse take-up of 
voluntary return programmes in Europe since the mid-1980s, little has been written 
on this subject over the past two decades. The onset of the 2008/09 crisis has pre-
cipitated debates on these policies. This paper aims to inform those debates by re-
viewing the lessons from the VRP programmes of the 1970s and 1980s and drawing 
preliminary conclusions from the most recent programme implemented in Spain. 
The study consists of four parts. It starts with a brief review of the most recent lit-
erature on return migration in the context of economic fl uctuations. To set the stage 
for the discussion of the contemporary Spanish voluntary return programmes, the 
second part briefl y sums up various categories of return incentives instituted in 
the 1970s and 1980s in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, the four 
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countries which instituted voluntary returns as a part of a redefi nition of migration 
policy in the post 1973/4 crisis. It argues that these policies were most successful 
when they involved cooperation with the countries of origin, development aid and 
integration of those migrants who decided to stay on. 
The third part focuses on the current Spanish voluntary return programmes, 
particularly the Programa de Abono Anticipado de Prestación a Extranjeros (APRE) 
– the programme created specifi cally to assist migrants in the fi nancial crisis. This 
part discusses the main assumption underlying the current Spanish VRPs, namely 
that foreign workers and their homelands would acquiesce to voluntary return. It 
argues that the countries characterised by improving economic, political and social 
conditions (e.g. Romania) have been more inclined to readmit their migrants, whilst 
countries in more dire economic, political and social straits (e.g. Morocco) preferred 
Spain to improve migrants’ working and living conditions and encouraged the Di-
aspora to send remittances and invest at home without giving up their residence 
abroad. When discussing the positions of the countries of origin, this part makes 
further references to the VRPs of the 1970s and 1980s, which were also shaped by 
the attitudes of migrants and their countries of origin.
The fourth part assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Spanish VRPs. It sug-
gests that while VRPs allow migrants to return home in dignity, they cannot address 
more complex migration policy challenges, particularly: insuffi cient labour and so-
cial integration of those who cannot or do not want to leave Spain; defi ciencies in 
migrants’ labour and social integration; persistence of jobs that native populations 
do not want to perform under the conditions offered; as well as signifi cant econom-
ic and social gaps between Spain and migrants’ countries of origin. For this reason, 
when expanding VRPs the Spanish authorities should not delay the efforts to foster 
(1) the full labour and social integration of migrants already living in Spain; (2) de-
cent working and living conditions for migrants (e.g. through pre-admission rules 
and post-admission verifi cation); (3) rationalisation, mechanisation, and off-shoring 
of production in the most labour-intensive sectors; and (4) sustainable development 
of the countries of origin.
Current voluntary return programmes from the European Union are based on 
the general EU and specifi c national legislation on return migration. Delimiting the 
scope of contemporary analysis to Spain, this article focuses on a study of Spanish 
legislation, particularly the two decrees which regulated the APRE programme as of 
May 2010 (RD 4/2008 and RD 1800/2008). The quantitative results of the programme 
have been provided by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and by the Madrid offi ce 
of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The lessons from past pro-
grammes in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium are based on a review 
of the pertinent literature, including the SOPEMI reports on trends in migration in 
OECD states. Since the goal of the debate on the voluntary return programmes of 
the 1970s and the 1980s was to identify the key lessons learned rather than provide 
a full-blown analysis, I limited the analysis of those programmes to a review of the 
literature and of the data provided in the annual OECD SOPEMI reports.
Voluntary returns from Spain were co-fi nanced by the Spanish Ministry of Labour 
and Immigration. They were implemented by the IOM and a number of non-govern-
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mental organisations, including but not limited to the Asociación de Cooperación 
Bolivia España (ACOBE), Asociación Comisión Católica Española de Migración (AC-
CEM), RESCATE, América – España Solidaridad y Cooperación (AESCO), Spanish-
Ecuadorian Association RUMIÑAHUI, El Movimiento Por la Paz (MPDL), Consorcio 
de Entidades para la Acción Integral con Migrantes (CEPAIM), and the Spanish Red 
Cross. To gather data, I conducted telephone interviews with the representatives of 
the IOM offi ce in Madrid, reviewed documentation from the Ministry of Labour, the 
IOM and non-governmental organisations (NGO) concerning VRPs, and examined 
migrants’ opinions as expressed in the polls conducted by the ATIME migrant or-
ganisation and Spanish social scientists from Colectivo IOE. 
One limitation to data gathering was the scarcity of data on migrants’ gender, 
age, civil status, education and employment. Some programme application forms 
do not require migrants to provide such data. In other cases, the migrants them-
selves do not provide such information. From the programme administrators’ point 
of view, this data is not as important as the information on the country to which 
migrants want to return. 
2 Return migration in the context of economic fl uctuations
As of late 2011, a number of authors suggested that return migration in the context 
of the 2008/09 crisis was not likely to be massive due to migrants being reunited 
with their families in the host countries (Castles 2011; Dobson et al. 2009), to the 
homelands’ dependence on remittances (Bastia 2011), and to an uncertain reinte-
gration perspective in the countries of origin, as well as to the homelands’ ambiva-
lent stance on return migration (Boccagni/Lagomarsino 2011). 
In an attempt to provide migrants with greater incentives to return, certain vol-
untary return policies provided migrants with post-return labour market integration 
assistance (IOM 2011). However, even the most comprehensive development-fos-
tering return incentives have produced mixed results in the past (Martin 1990). Fur-
thermore, there is little conclusive evidence on whether and how migration affects 
development. Jones (1998) and de Haas (2005) suggested that migration may exac-
erbate inequality. Black et al. (2005) argued that it is inequality rather than absolute 
levels of poverty and deprivation that encourage migration. 
Castles (2011) and Dobson et al. (2009) have suggested that demand for migrants 
is likely to persist because of the shortage of adequately-trained native workers or 
their unwillingness to work in certain jobs. Arguing that certain voluntary returns, 
such as those concerning rejected asylum-seekers, are only nominally voluntary, 
Van Houte and Davids (2008) argued that voluntary return policies may fail to pre-
vent migrants from re-emigrating to the host countries shortly after leaving them.
In order to address the root causes of migration and to render returns sustain-
able, some scholars and policymakers advocated freer trade, poverty alleviation 
and other forms of economic aid to the countries of origin. However, de Haas (2007) 
argued that improved economic and social conditions in migrants’ countries of ori-
gin are likely to encourage and facilitate migration in the short run. 
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For Adepoju et al. migration management should be based on genuinely bilateral 
or multilateral agreements. Throughout the early 2000s, migration agreements still 
aimed to expatriate irregular migrants without much consideration for migrants’ 
homelands. The recent growth of development-linked migration agreements is 
likely to enhance bilateralism and multilateralism. But it is not only the developed, 
but also the developing states that could contribute towards better migration man-
agement by taking a more coordinated and more decisive role on migration issues 
(Adepoju et al. 2010: 68). This paper adds to the literature on voluntary returns 
explaining why a considerable proportion of migrants, particularly those from the 
countries characterised by signifi cant economic, social and political gaps, could not 
be expected to return, at least in the short run, and what could be done to address 
this challenge. Whilst recognising the need for VRPs, the paper calls for the inte-
gration of those who will settle, as well as a reduction in the push and pull factors 
contributing towards the accumulation of migrants in the least stable jobs. As the 
next section suggests, the host countries were already attempting to create better 
employment opportunities in migrants’ countries of origin in the 1980s, but have 
gradually learned that some of the migrants would not leave, thereby triggering a 
need for their integration. 
3 Western European voluntary return programmes in the aftermath 
of the 1973/74 crisis
Voluntary return programmes have been implemented in Western Europe since 
1977 in the context of the economic and social malaise lingering after the 1973/4 
oil crisis as well as rising asylum-seeker fl ows. France, Germany, Netherlands and 
Belgium found it politically and administratively diffi cult to expatriate migrants by 
force, and therefore decided to make it possible for migrants to depart voluntarily. 
The programmes differed in their objectives and mechanisms, with some (such as 
France) offering migrants greater reintegration assistance upon their return home 
than others (such as Belgium). One way in which Spain could have learned from 
those programmes was through the experiences of its own nationals. Spanish citi-
zens constituted a signifi cant proportion of the foreign workers within all four coun-
tries, particularly in France.
France was the fi rst country to authorise VRPs, and by 2010 had developed the 
most complex set of such policies in Europe. The French VRP debuted with the 1977 
scheme offering 10,000 French Francs to any non-EC foreigner who would renounce 
any claims to French social security and leave the country. The programme did not 
attract much interest among the citizens of the most impoverished countries of ori-
gin because their governments were not prepared to provide returnees with work 
and housing. Thus, the French authorities have attempted since 1980 to support the 
homelands in the reintegration of returning migrants. As of 2009, both documented 
and undocumented migrants were entitled to some form of VRP consisting of a free 
return ticket, departure bonuses of up to € 2,000 per adult and € 1,000 per each 
child, € 7,000 in labour market reinsertion grants and consultative services. 
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The German Länder have attempted to administer a VRP since 1975, but it was 
not until 1983 that the Federal Government authorised immediate repayments of so-
cial security and return aid for non-EC migrants willing to depart from Germany. The 
amounts paid to the benefi ciaries of the social security reimbursement programme 
varied depending on the contributions made by each migrant. Additionally, mi-
grants were able to withdraw their government-subsidised savings before maturity 
and without penalty, as well as receiving severance pay. They had to leave Germany 
and could not return there in subsequent years to take up work. The programme did 
not stipulate that family members had to accompany departing migrants. The return 
aid was limited to those migrants who had become unemployed or forced to work 
short hours. Migrants were entitled to DM 10,500 per adult and DM 1,500 per child 
plus consultative services (OECD 1983: 16; OECD 1984: 35). Unlike the benefi ciaries 
of the social security repayment programme, the benefi ciaries of return aid had to 
leave Germany with their spouses and dependent children, and were not permitted 
to return to work. The Federal Government did not renew the two programmes, 
claiming that it was job creation in the countries of origin that should form the basis 
for a return policy (OECD 1985: 36). 
Around 306,000 foreigners were reported to have left Germany during the Re-
patriation Assistance Act period from November 1983 to September 1984 (OECD 
1988: 7), mostly to Turkey. 85 % of applicants for return aid (14,459 out of 16,833) 
and for the social security refund (120,000 out of 140,000) were Turkish (OECD 1985: 
36). While their return relieved unemployment pressures in Germany, it intensifi ed 
them in Turkey. Some 250,000 Turks returned from Germany and elsewhere in 1984, 
notably Libya where Turkish companies were experiencing a 50 % decrease in em-
ployment due to falling oil prices (OECD 1986: 22). Unemployment in Turkey was 
16.5 % in 1984. The Turkish government took a number of steps to facilitate the rein-
sertion of returnees, including customs exemptions, business start-up and housing 
loans, as well as “catch-up courses” for migrants’ children (OECD 1986: 22).
The Dutch considered paying migrants up to 5,000 guilders for returning as early 
as in 1974, but the investigators concluded that the Dutch Ministry of Development 
should promote development in the countries of origin regardless of whether their 
migrants returned or not. Only 10 % of the funds originally destined for voluntary 
return were allotted for the purpose of voluntary repatriation. Even though most of 
the returnees whom the programme supported were successful, the Dutch govern-
ment terminated the programme in 1984. It was argued that the programme’s re-
sults did not justify its high costs and that the emphasis on return contradicted the 
spirit of the Netherland’s new “minorities policy” (Rogers 1997: 160).
With the introduction of its “minorities policy” in the early 1980s, the Dutch gov-
ernment favoured the settlement of labour migrants. The Scientifi c Council for Gov-
ernment Policy proposed to structure the policy based on the assumption that most 
migrants would stay in the Netherlands, and that the efforts should be directed 
at their integration rather than their return. The Dutch government nevertheless 
authorised two new return programmes in 1985. These involved no deadlines but 
prohibited remigration to the Netherlands, which was not well received by migrants 
and their countries of origin (Rogers 1997: 157). 
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The fi rst programme provided migrants with free return tickets and subsistence 
costs for the fi rst three months in the home country. The second programme ena-
bled migrants aged over 55 (lowered to 50 since October 1987) to return home with-
out losing their unemployment benefi ts. Returnees under this programme received 
unemployment benefi ts corresponding to the cost of living in their homelands until 
they turned 65 and thus became eligible to receive pensions (Rogers 1997: 158). 
According to the OECD SOPEMI reports, neither of the two Dutch programmes 
signifi cantly infl uenced the return migration fi gures, particularly among migrants 
who had reunifi ed with their families in the Netherlands. Settlement was to a large 
extent facilitated by the Citizenship Act of December 19, 1984 which granted Dutch 
nationality to 34,600 persons (OECD 1987: 35), as well as by the poor employment 
perspectives at home (Muus 1988: 7).
In 1984, Belgium authorised a modest return assistance programme for humani-
tarian reasons. Apart from a free return ticket, participating migrants were offered a 
small amount of cash as well as fi nancial support to offset moving and travel costs. 
However, out of approximately 200 persons who participated in it, most were asy-
lum-seekers. The authorities therefore created a new programme on 1 August 1985. 
The programme was available to non-EC nationals who had been unemployed for at 
least a year. It paid a bonus equal to 312 times the daily unemployment compensa-
tion, plus 50,000 and 15,000 Belgian francs to spouses and children, respectively. 
In exchange for return assistance, migrants had to return with their families, re-
nounce their social and economic rights and privileges in Belgium, and they are not 
allowed to return to work in Belgium in the future (OECD 1985: 7). In Belgium, like 
in the Netherlands, settled migrants were able to benefi t from reformed naturalisa-
tion legislation. The new law was a major reason for the 5.7 % drop in the migrant 
population in Belgium in 1985.It most likely also led to the poor VRP application rate. 
Only 594 people, mostly Turks, decided to benefi t from the programme until it was 
terminated in July 1989 (OECD 1987: 21; OECD 1990: 16).
Thirty-fi ve years after the authorisation of fi rst VRP in Europe, there is no evi-
dence to what extent VRPs stimulate returns and to what degree they subsidise the 
returns of those who were going to return anyway. The numbers of migrants who 
benefi tted from these schemes were often smaller than expected by the receiving 
host countries, and larger than considered sustainable by the homelands. As migra-
tion fl ows linked receiving countries to increasingly more economically, politically 
and culturally distant countries of origin, providing migrants with the opportunities 
for a sustainable return became more diffi cult.
One major difference between the contemporary Spanish and the four historical 
Western European programmes was that historical programmes were conceived 
between three and ten years after the peak of the economic crisis, while the con-
temporary Spanish programme was instituted during the recession. The former 
programmes addressed migrants who had already had time to grasp the new eco-
nomic reality, whilst the contemporary programme addressed migrants who were 
not sure what the future would bring. Another major difference between the two 
generations of programmes stemmed from globalisation. Transportation costs had 
become lower by the late 2000s, making it possible for the host states to open the 
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programme to a larger number of migrants, but also making it easier for migrants 
to re-emigrate if they found that the conditions at home were not what they had 
expected them to be. The availability of cheap communication infrastructures also 
allowed programme administrators and migrants to gather relatively precise infor-
mation regarding the conditions awaiting them upon return. Last but not least, the 
programmes of the 2000s benefi tted from the fi nancial support of the European 
Union and the logistical support of the International Organization for Migration and 
of plenty of NGOs, both in Europe and in migrants’ countries of origin. While VRPs 
were a novelty in the context of the 1973/4 crisis, and could be regarded with sus-
picion in the context of the 2008/09 crisis, they were known, enjoyed a larger fi nan-
cial and administrative infrastructure, and thus had legitimacy. In short, one would 
expect the VRPs of the 2000s to have been much more successful than those of 
the 1970s and the 1980s. The following sections will attempt to shed more light on 
whether they have done so or not.
4 Spain’s 2009-2010 voluntary return programmes
Spain was among the fastest-growing immigration countries in Europe throughout 
the 2000s. The immigrant population in Spain grew by an average of 500,000 people 
a year between 1999 and 2008 (Ferrero-Turrión 2010: 96). At the height of the crisis, 
in 2009, the foreign-born population constituted 14.3 % of the total population in 
Spain (OECD 2011: 325). However, foreigners were also most affected by the crisis. 
In the third trimester of 2011 the unemployment rate in Spain was 21.52 % (32.72 
among foreigners and 19.50 among Spanish citizens) (INE 2011: 1-2). Moroccans 
(22.08 %), Romanians (15.71 %), Ecuadorians (9.93 %) and Colombians (6.05 %) 
constituted over half of all foreign workers drawing unemployment benefi ts (INEM 
2011: 65). Most of them had lost employment in construction, services and agricul-
ture, the three sectors worst affected by the crisis. Immigration to Spain had been 
closely tied to these sectors, and to construction in particular. Hence their decline 
translated immediately into heightened unemployment among foreign workers. 
The Spanish government had expected migrants who had not yet come to Spain 
to postpone migration plans and migrants who had already arrived in Spain to repat-
riate. As far as the new fl ows are concerned, the economic crisis marked a decline in 
migration fl ows across all categories of migrants. Between 2008 (690,000) and 2009 
(470,000), migration fl ows to Spain declined by over 30 %. The infl ows declined 
across all major categories: The number of new residence visas issued decreased 
from 290,000 in 2008 to 160,000 in 2009; the number of foreign-born seasonal work-
ers recruited in the countries of origin fell from 42,000 in 2008 to 6,000 in 2009; the 
number of asylum applicants decreased by one-third to about 3,000; the number of 
irregular migrants apprehended at Spain’s maritime borders decreased from 13,000 
in 2008 to only 9,000 in 2009 and less than 200 in 2010 (OECD 2011: 324). The sec-
ond expectation – concerning the voluntary repatriation of migrants already present 
in Spain – is discussed in detail in the sections that follow. 
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4.1 The Three Major Categories of Spain’s VRPs
Since December 2010, migrants in Spain have been able to apply to one of three 
categories of voluntary return programmes: (1) humanitarian-based PREVIE, PREVI-
CAT, PREVICAM, PREVIVAL;1 (2) unemployment-based (APRE); and (3) investment-
based. While co-designed and co-fi nanced by the Spanish Ministry of Labour, the 
programmes were managed by the IOM and approved humanitarian or migrant or-
ganisations.2
The humanitarian and investment-based VRPs targeted both legal and illegal 
migrants, as well as unprocessed asylum-seekers. In order to qualify, those apply-
ing for the humanitarian programme had to prove that they could no longer sup-
port themselves in Spain. By contrast, those applying for the investment-based 
programme had to have a post-return investment plan. The humanitarian and in-
vestment-based VRPs targeted both European Union (EU) and non-EU citizens. The 
unemployment-based VRP (APRE) targeted those legal migrants who wished to col-
lect the lump sum of their unemployment benefi ts immediately. It was opened up to 
citizens of those non-EU countries which had concluded social security agreements 
with Spain.
The benefi ciaries of all programmes were entitled to free transportation home. 
The families of the benefi ciaries of the humanitarian-based and unemployment-
based programmes had their travel costs covered as well. Each programme pro-
vided returnees with € 50 in pocket money (per returnee, up to € 400). The humani-
tarian and investment-based VRPs offered € 400 in return grants per person, up 
to € 1,600 per family or group of investors. APRE returnees were excluded from 
departure bonuses as it was assumed that their unemployment benefi ts would be 
greater. The investment-based programme additionally granted a project-specifi c 
development grant of € 1,500, up to € 5,000 for projects implemented by several 
entrepreneurs.
4.2 APRE: the special VRP to boost returns in the context of the 
2008/2010 crisis
The APRE programme was advertised in all of Spain’s employment services of-
fi ces, where the applications had to be completed. Candidates had to be citizens of 
a country which: (1) had a social security agreement with Spain and (2) was not a 
member of the EU, the European Economic Area or Switzerland. The fi rst condition 
aimed to ensure that workers would be able to collect the departure bonuses once 
1 The four programmes correspond to the geographical scope of their implementation. PREVIE 
(Programa de Retorno Voluntario de Inmigrantes desde España) has been implemented in all of 
Spain, PREVICAT (Programa de Retorno Voluntario de Inmigrantes desde Cataluña) in Cataluña, 
PREVICAM (Programa de Retorno Voluntario de Inmigrantes de la Comunidad de Madrid) in 
Madrid, and PREVIVAL (Programa de Retorno Voluntario de Inmigrantes desde Valencia) in 
Valencia.  
2 Personal communication with Paloma Sevillano, IOM Madrid, 18 November 2010.
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they returned home. The second condition aimed to prevent workers from return-
ing to Spain after having collected the bonus. According to these two principles, 
the VRP applied to citizens of Argentina, Andorra, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, the United States, the Philippines, Mo-
rocco, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Russia, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela 
(MTAS 2010).
Migrants who wished to participate in the APRE programme had to be eligi-
ble for unemployment benefi ts. Migrants could sign up for the programme at any 
point in time while they were receiving such benefi ts, but the longer they waited 
the smaller the voluntary return benefi ts they were going to obtain. When unem-
ployed migrants exhaust their unemployment benefi ts, they become illegible for 
the programme. Thus, while the APRE VRP was cost-effective, it limited itself to as-
sisting those migrants who were likely to leave Spain from the very outset. With the 
amount of benefi ts decreasing over time, the programme was ill-prepared to attract 
undecided migrants, not to mention those who regarded repatriation from Spain as 
the last resort. 
Even those migrants who are a priori open to the idea of returning may fi nd it 
diffi cult to depart right away because of the time involved in paying off loans; selling 
property and equipment; being released from house rent contracts; as well as fi nd-
ing new housing, jobs and schools for children in the country of origin. The single 
workers with families back home are least constrained by those pre-departure pre-
requisites, but entire families require both time and assistance to make return deci-
sions, particularly if one spouse continues to work, children are attending school 
and family members back in the countries of origin cannot help in fi nding jobs and 
housing. 
The Spanish VRPs provided relatively weak return incentives for family mem-
bers. Apart from free transportation, similar schemes operating during the crisis in 
France paid € 3,500 to a married couple and € 1,000 per child (up to three children 
and € 500 for any additional child). The Czech crisis VRP paid € 500 to the spouse 
and € 250 per child. The Spanish programme provided €  400 per spouse. Spanish 
returnees also received € 50 in pocket money each (up to € 400 for a family) (MTAS 
2010).
Even the countries which paid bonuses to returning family members found it 
challenging to convince migrants to leave. Among other things, migrants could 
have been preoccupied as to the extent to which their return would affect their 
children’s ability to succeed in future. Thus, some migrants just stayed to give their 
children the opportunity to start their lives from a better position than their parents 
did. Unlike some German Länder in the 1970s and 1980s, Spain did not prepare the 
children of migrant workers for their return home. Educating migrant children with 
Spanish children was expected to foster their integration, which was considered 
more important than preparing them for a possible return. In order to provide mi-
grant children with educational opportunities in the countries of origin equivalent to 
those which were afforded to them in Spain, returning migrants would need to send 
their children to costly private schools. This was not an option in rural areas of most 
of the countries of origin. According to Laura Tedesco, an Argentinean political sci-
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entist, many Ecuadorian migrants to Spain originate from rural areas which lack 
basic services such as free healthcare and education. Such services are available to 
migrants who decide to stay in Spain (Moffett/House 2010).
Once migrants committed themselves to voluntary return, they received one 
way tickets, € 50 per person for travel to the port of departure as well as 40 % of the 
unclaimed unemployment benefi ts available to them. In exchange, they had to leave 
Spain within 30 days. They could change their mind before receiving the 40 % pay-
ment, but not after. Once in the country of origin, the returnees must report in per-
son to the Spanish embassy or consulate to surrender any documents necessary 
to live and work in Spain (work and residence permits, identity card, social security 
card, health care card, etc.) to the Spanish diplomatic mission abroad in order to 
receive the remaining 60 % of their unemployment bonus. 
Sending migrants home requires considerable psychological, administrative and 
fi nancial assistance. Since the 1980s, the French government has provided return-
ing migrants with pre-departure counselling, professional training and assistance 
in selling property. The French encouraged the countries of origin to reduce duties 
on imported goods and even provided migrants with funds to purchase work tools 
as well as subsidising their transportation. The Spanish authorities did not provide 
migrants with comprehensive counselling or administrative or fi nancial assistance, 
thereby making it more diffi cult for migrants to leave and for the countries of origin 
to receive them. According to the Ecuadorian Migration Offi ce, migrants who were 
entitled to smaller return benefi ts found it diffi cult to afford to return home because 
the money spent on transporting belongings decreased the ability of returned mi-
grants to invest at home. To make up for this problem, the Ecuadorian Migration 
Offi ce authorised duty exemptions for returning migrants. One of the main goals of 
such exemptions was to allow migrants to bring all the tools necessary to start up in 
business upon their return (SENAMI 2012a). 
Unemployed migrant workers were eligible for the same retraining packages as 
unemployed Spanish workers. However, the Spanish government did not offer spe-
cifi c retraining services to migrants participating in APRE in their home countries. 
France has organised labour market reinsertion programmes to the home countries 
since 1984. At fi rst the programmes aimed to lure migrant workers to depart and ac-
cepted almost any post-return projects that migrants proposed. But with time, and 
perhaps in response to illegal returns to France of those who failed to establish a 
sustainable business in the countries of origin, the French government began to pay 
more attention to the quality of pre- as well as post-departure training so as to max-
imise the sustainability of migrants’ return. By 2009, France’s migrants were eligible 
for up to € 7,000 in seed money, project planning and project follow up assistance 
to become self-employed upon their return to their home countries. 
It is surprising that the Spanish government expected the countries of origin to 
willingly accept their migrants given that Spain herself was reluctant to readmit its 
own nationals from Western Europe in the 1980s. A magazine for Spaniards abroad 
published by the Spanish government emphasised: “Many (emigrants), even if they 
wish it, cannot return to Spain right now, given the economic and social crisis situa-
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tion experienced by the Spanish economy” (Struckow y Gonzalez 1986: 27 in Rogers 
1997: 158).
4.3 The non-unanimous position of the countries of origin
The governments of economically, politically and socially stable countries favoured 
the permanent return of their migrant workers. By contrast, the governments of 
the countries which were yet to achieve such stability generally preferred migrants 
to send remittances and invest at home, while residing abroad (Lahlou 2006: 14). 
These governments would not reject any migrant returning voluntarily. However, 
they did not actively encourage migrants to return. From the Spanish perspective, it 
was not the citizens of the more highly developed, but rather of the less-developed 
countries which needed to depart fi rst. Romania demonstrated considerable inter-
est in expanding the programme to its citizens because it viewed the EU investment 
funds as much more valuable than remittances. By contrast, with the exception of 
some basic return incentives such as exemptions from import duties, Morocco did 
not appear very supportive of the programme. Morocco was more interested in the 
regularisation and integration of its citizens abroad than in their permanent return 
(Lahlou 2006: 13-14; Sorensen 2004: 8). Experiments with organised permanent 
return to Morocco have not been successful (Sorensen 2004: 9). By 2010, 9.3 % of 
Moroccan population resided abroad remitting 6,447 million US dollars annually. 
With the economic crisis having a minor negative impact on remittance fl ows to 
Morocco (Table 1), Moroccan authorities would have undercut an important source 
of income if their emigrants were to come home for extended periods of time. How-
ever, Moroccan authorities’ interest in using remittances as a tool for the country’s 
development may enhance returns if these were to be based on Diaspora invest-
ments rather than extended or permanent returns, as the Spanish government had 
hoped. 
The benefi ciaries of the APRE programme were prohibited from re-entering 
Spain for three years following departure. Migrants suspected that the three-year 
ban aimed to make them settle in their countries of origin because of the high costs 
of moving back and forth. The lessons from the French 1977 programme revealed 
that Portuguese and Spaniards who had left for home on voluntary return bonuses 
had returned to France illegally prior to the 1982 legalisation (Weil 1991: 327). Many 
migrants wished that they could have a trial period to return to Spain at any time if 
the conditions at home were not propitious for resettlement. 
Tab. 1: Remittances to Morocco, 2003-2010 (in millions of US dollars)
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Remittances 3,614 4,221 4,590 5,451 6,730 6,895 6,271 6,447 
Source: Own calculation, based on Ratha/Mohapatra/Silwal 2011.
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The ban on returns to Spain was one reason why the APRE programme did not 
apply to EU citizens. With no internal controls and the EU right to reside anywhere 
in the EU, it would be impossible to extend the programme for instance to Romani-
ans. The Romanian government was nonetheless interested in extending voluntary 
return to its citizens because emigration had reduced its ability to attract foreign 
investment and use post-accession EU funds. The Romanian government did not 
have enough funds to motivate its citizens to return, and counted on the support 
through the Spanish VRP. 
While the Romanian government viewed the economic crisis in Spain as an op-
portunity for national development, Morocco and Ecuador appeared to know the 
limits of their capacity to integrate returnees. They faced a dilemma between ac-
cepting the returnees or acquiescing to their downward labour mobility from year-
long or full-time jobs to seasonal jobs and part-time jobs. Since the Spanish VRP did 
not include any training or job-creation provisions, the non-EU countries expected 
the programme to increase unemployment pressures and interrupt the fl ow of re-
mittances. 
The non-EU countries of origin were interested in the social and economic well-
being of their citizens. Whilst they supported the spontaneous return of their citi-
zens, and even co-fi nanced it through customs exemptions and other minor post-
return assistance measures, their resources for reception were limited, particularly 
if migrants were to come home en masse and all at the same time. The Ecuadorian 
President Rafael Correa acknowledged that Ecuador was not able to assist all 50,000 
unemployed Ecuadorians if they were to return from Spain (Gallego-Díaz/Creamer 
2009). The onset of the economic crisis further reduced their capacities for recep-
tion, not only because they were affected by the crisis too, but also because Spain 
was not the only country which attempted to expatriate their nationals. From the 
Spanish perspective, if all of the Moroccan, Ecuadorian and Colombian workers 
who were eligible for unemployment benefi ts were to depart, their countries of ori-
gin would need to receive around 36,000, 21,000 and 11,000 returnees, respectively. 
However, from the Moroccan, Ecuadorian and Colombian perspective, the numbers 
of returnees were signifi cantly larger given the simultaneous voluntary return pro-
gramme in France as well as spontaneous and forced returns of their Diasporas 
from other countries. The cautious stand on return migration among the countries 
of origin predated the crisis. Had Spanish offi cials taken it into consideration, they 
would have been able to build a policy based on more realistic assumptions. But 
they had not. Hence a perception of uncooperativeness on the part of the countries 
of origin arose when the programme started.
According to the Ecuadorian Migration Offi ce (SENAMI – Secretaría Nacional del 
Migrante), voluntary return policies should be based on genuine cooperation with 
the host states, should allow migrants to maintain their residence in Spain while 
strengthening links with Ecuador through remittance transfers and investment, 
should allow them to circulate back and forth between Spain and Ecuador; and if 
they decide to settle back in Ecuador, they should be offered enough time, fi nancial 
and professional support to ensure that they would be fi nancially and socially stable 
enough not to want to re-emigrate to Spain (SENAMI 2009). 
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Despite divergent conceptualisations of VRP, Ecuador developed the most com-
prehensive set of reception policies, as compared to the two other countries with 
the largest number of migrants eligible to return (Morocco and Colombia). The Ec-
uadorian “Welcome Home” policy consisted of duty exemptions on household and 
professional equipment brought from abroad, housing loans and business start-up 
funds. Ecuadorian migrants who had lived abroad for at least one year could be ex-
empt from duty on household appliances, tools and machinery valued up to $ 4,000. 
Additionally, they could import one car worth up to $ 15,000 (SENAMI 2012a). Mi-
grants who were going to return anyway welcomed the duty exemption, but those 
who were undecided considered it too modest given the high shipping costs and 
other fees involved. Ecuadorian returnees who did not own a house in Ecuador 
could also apply for a housing loan of up to $ 50,000. Some migrants would have 
preferred the loan not to tie them to government-approved construction companies, 
as some regarded these companies as slow and considered that they sold houses 
at infl ated costs (Migrante Ecuatoriano 2009). Migrants could apply for a housing 
loan prior to arrival in Ecuador. It remains to be seen whether having secured a loan, 
migrants would arrive home or would wait until the house was almost complete, as 
well as whether they would prefer to live in that house or consider it as an additional 
source of income while continuing to reside in Spain. 
Since January 2007, returning migrants who have resided abroad for at least 
one year have also been able to compete for investment grants. This initiative in-
spired the greatest optimism among Ecuadorian migrants abroad. The grant aimed 
to help Ecuadorians develop a new investment or support an existing one. Ideally, 
investment would concern agriculture, tourism, transportation and services, as well 
as being innovative and having a multiplier effect. The funds were expected to be 
complementary, thereby favouring migrants who had returned home with substan-
tial savings (SENAMI 2011).
In 2011, the grant amounted to up to $ 15,000 or $ 50,000, depending on whether 
the project had an individual/family or community character (SENAMI 2011). Many 
projects were used to support farms and grocery stores. Given the potential for the 
“overcrowding” of the same type of business initiative, migrants and the grant se-
lection committee were concerned about the originality and thus the sustainability 
of the projects. Migrants felt that investment-based programmes needed to be cou-
pled with comprehensive project development support both at the project planning 
and implementation stages (SENAMI 2011).
To assist migrants in making a return decision, the Ecuadorian government pro-
vided its cultural institutes in Spain – Casas Ecuatorianas – with the fi nancial and ad-
ministrative capacity to keep the Diaspora informed about what they could expect 
in Ecuador on their return (SENAMI 2012b). The Casas facilitated contact between 
migrants and potential employers in Ecuador, provided information on educational 
reinsertion of migrant children, and assisted migrant families with some adminis-
trative tasks associated with departure. The staff at the Casas attempted to offer 
migrants the most realistic information necessary to make a decision. They did not 
aim to convince migrants to come back if the conditions for their return (migrants’ 
post-return plans, preparation, economic conditions in the place of return, etc.) sug-
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gested that they might be worse off in Ecuador than in Spain. The Casas offered 
migrants a number of social and professional services aimed at maintaining a link 
between migrants and Ecuador, regardless of whether and when they might opt to 
return. Citizens of other countries could also benefi t from the advice necessary to 
make an objective decision regarding whether to return or stay. These consultation 
services were usually provided by migrant organisations, NGOs, religious leaders 
and the IOM. 
Colombia had attempted to readmit its workers in the past and scrutinised similar 
efforts made by other Latin American countries. In an attempt to enable its citizens 
to continue their business activities upon their return, Colombia had by the 1970s al-
ready experimented with duty exemptions incentives similar to those implemented 
by Ecuador after 2008. The duty incentives did not precipitate signifi cant returns 
to Colombia because migrants were more concerned with political and economic 
stability at home than with the cost of return. The success of return migration to 
Chile after 1973 demonstrated that political stability can spur return migration by 
itself (Rogers 1981: 350). Given the lessons of the past, and the awareness of its in-
ability to boost migrants’ confi dence in economic and political stability, Colombia 
both facilitated returns and tried to improve migrants’ living and working conditions 
in Spain. 
By 2008, the Moroccan Diaspora abroad was estimated at 3 million. In most 
cases, Moroccan migrants maintained close social, cultural and economic ties with 
their country of origin (IOM 2010c). Reliant on remittances, and aware of the high 
costs associated with effective voluntary return programmes, the Moroccan gov-
ernment prioritised the amelioration of migrants’ working and living conditions over 
permanent returns. Rabat held that Moroccans should have the right to work and 
live abroad if it is to help their families in Morocco and, if their families joined them 
abroad, they should have the right to invest in Morocco without compromising their 
legal status in the countries of origin. The preference for gradual, and not neces-
sarily permanent, return stemmed not only from Morocco’s own experience, but 
also from the lessons drawn from the Franco-Algerian return experience. When the 
French authorities authorised the 1977 voluntary return programme, the Algerian 
authorities did not look forward to grappling with the secondary labour, social and 
political integration of its long-term emigrants, who overall had spent more time 
abroad than in Algeria. It feared any returns that were not genuine (Miller 1979: 334) 
or small enough to integrate.
Many Algerians who returned home in the aftermath of the 1973/74 oil crisis did 
so because they had planned to return anyway. In most cases, the undecided Alge-
rians returned only when they were guaranteed jobs and housing (Adler 1976: 42 
in Rogers 1981: 350). Similar to Algeria, Morocco was only able to provide jobs and 
housing over an extended period of time and to a limited number of returnees.
Remittances to Morocco grew from DHS 20 billion in 1998 to DHS 57 billion in 
2007. Since 2005 they have represented around 8 % of GDP, 290 % of foreign direct 
investment, 700 % of development aid and the most important source of foreign 
currency. They accounted for Morocco’s positive balance of payments (MAEC 2009). 
Until roughly 2005, most Moroccans had invested in real estate. However, since the 
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Moroccan real estate market became saturated, migrants started to purchase real 
estate in their host countries, particularly in those cases where their spouses had 
arrived and their children had been born abroad (Hamdouch 2005: 71).
According to Youssef Amrani, the director of bilateral relations at the Moroccan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, migrants should be able to freely circulate back and 
forth between Morocco and the host country, so as to allow them and Morocco 
seamless re-adaptation in the labour market and society (Marrakech Info 2008). In 
this respect, Moroccan authorities, just like migrants, opposed the three-year pro-
hibition to return to Spain.
Apart from free transportation and a departure bonus, Moroccan migrants re-
turning from Spain could only count on the Moukawalati Project start-up loan pro-
vided by the Moroccan employment offi ce (ANAPEC). The loan was available to 
educated Moroccans who could cover 90 % of the project costs themselves. It was 
far less attractive than project start-up grants available to Moroccan returnees from 
France because those returning from France could obtain up to € 7,000 in project 
start-up grants distributed by the French ANAEM offi ce. Given that the French vol-
untary return programme did not make eligibility conditional on legal status, and 
the paucity of Spanish-French border controls, Spanish Moroccans with families 
in France may be able to increase their return benefi ts by temporarily moving to 
France so as to return with the assistance of the French rather than Spanish VRP.
Having grappled with the same challenge since 1977, by the early 2000s France 
began to redefi ne its voluntary return policy to do better justice to the interests of 
the countries of origin. The current French VRP encourages legal migrants to invest 
in their countries of origin while maintaining legal status in France with the so-called 
“circulatory visa” (visa de circulation), so that they could come back to France when-
ever they wish, or, if they fi nd it more benefi cial, run a business in the country of 
origin from France (France 2005: 57). Regardless of legal status, French migrants 
were allotted up to € 7,000 in investment start-up funds, and holders of permanent 
residence permits could apply for an additional € 1,067 to € 1,220 to research the 
feasibility of the the business plans they intended to carry out upon return. It may 
be too early to judge to what extent the French VRP would translate into increased 
departures. However, having attempted to make the programme more bilateral, the 
French programme seems to have been more popular among migrants, their coun-
tries of origin and French society than the unilateral Spanish programme.
Studies of Turkish returnees from Germany in the 1980s showed that at most 
50 % of the respondents in a given sample had created or found employment fol-
lowing their return; some studies found considerably lower proportions (Hönekopp 
1987 and Akcayli/Sen 1987 in Rogers 1997: 162). The spokespeople for home coun-
try governments warned migrants not to make return decisions hastily. Migrants 
were implored to plan their return carefully, to weigh carefully what they were giv-
ing up in terms of social benefi ts and entitlements by leaving the host country, 
and to know precisely whether they could buy into pension schemes in the home 
countries (Rogers 1997: 162).
A 1987 report on the second generation in Germany and Turkey advised mi-
grants not to return: “Return incentive policies are against Turkey’s interests. Return 
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is also against the interests of the returnees. In Turkey there are no institutions for 
reintegration that could assist returns. The bilateral agreements between Turkey 
and the Federal Republic of Germany do not work well. So far no reintegration as-
sistance project has come to fruition. Therefore the future of the second generation 
of Turkish migrants … remains in the Federal Republic” (Akcayli 1987: 21 in Rogers 
1997: 158).
4.4 Migrants and employers: scepticism about permanent return
Ecuadorian (Rumiñahui) and Moroccan (ATIME) organisations were sceptical 
whether the Spanish VRP would be able to attract many Ecuadorians and Moroc-
cans given what it offered and what it expected migrants to give up. They held that 
the bonus should be larger and that there should not be a prohibition to re-enter 
Spain. They emphasised that the countries of origin were not prepared to offer re-
turning migrants sustainable sources of income and housing.
According to Dora Aguirre, the president of Rumiñahui, even those migrants 
who collected up to € 7,000 in unemployment benefi ts would still fi nd it diffi cult to 
leave Spain (El Mundo 2008b). Whilst most Ecuadorians had originally planned to 
return home, their attitudes have changed the longer they stayed in Spain. In this 
respect, the post-Cold War migrants to Spain did not differ much from post-War 
migrants to France or Germany: They underwent what R. Böhning (1984: 79-86) de-
scribed as maturing of migration streams, and required a more complex policy built 
on the assumption that some would leave whilst others would not; facilitating their 
reintegration in the homelands as well as their full integration in the host society.
In a survey conducted by Colectivo IOE prior to the fi nancial crisis, Ecuadorian 
migrants explained the reasons motivating their prolonged stay in Spain and their 
return home (Fig. 1 and 2). Three-quarters of Ecuadorians decided to prolong their 
stay in Spain because they believed that they could secure better working and liv-
ing conditions there than in their homelands (26 %); because their family members 
had moved to Spain (23 %); because they had taken initial steps towards settlement 
(16 %); or because they hoped for social and labour mobility in Spain (10 %) (Fig. 1). 
By contrast, the three main reasons why the respondents expressed an interest in 
returning to Ecuador were family-related (41 %), homesickness (26 %) and dissatis-
faction with their lives in Spain (15 %) (Fig. 2).
Despite the Ecuadorian government’s efforts to facilitate return migration, Ecua-
dorian migrants appeared to doubt that employment opportunities at home would 
improve in the near future. Even if Ecuador could attract foreign investment the 
way Mexico did, it would fi rst occur in areas with decent infrastructure and only 
after that in the rural and geographically-isolated areas from which many migrants 
came. Even if maquiladoras (foreign capital supported factories) sprung up in Ec-
uador, work on an assembly line would mean downward labour mobility for many 
Ecuadorians who had worked in the Spanish service sector. The investment grant 
constituted an important incentive to return, but it required own capital and careful 
planning to overcome a whole range of administrative and practical challenges to 
investment in Ecuador’s less developed areas. 
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Even when unemployed, some migrants could be better off in Spain than in their 
countries of origin. Spanish law provides migrants with services such as free health 
care, free education for children and re-qualifi cation programmes, regardless of 
legal and employment status. Furthermore, the crisis had a milder effect on the de-
mand for workers in agriculture, services and tourism, and in the informal economy. 
Thus, as long as foreign migrants were willing to accept diffi cult work for low pay, 
they had an alternative. The longer migrants stayed in Spain, the more rights they 
were afforded. The voluntary return programme promised that after a three-year 
stay abroad, migrants would be able to claim the period of legal residence in Spain 
to adjust their status and e.g. migrants who had earned permanent status would not 
be negatively affected. However, to return, migrants would have to apply for new 
visas (SEPE 2012).
The Minister of Labour considered VRP to be consistent with the Spanish policy 
on labour migration, as it enforced the principle that migrant workers should be 
admitted in view of the ability of the Spanish labour market and society to integrate 
them. The Minister explained that the new economic scenario, characterised by 
signifi cant growth in unemployment, required that the national labour reserve, be it 
Spanish or legally-resident foreign nationals, be given priority in employment. Only 
when these sources are exhausted should employers be permitted to bring workers 
from outside of Spain (MTAS 2008b). 
Like migrant organisations, labour unions also feared that immigrants had not 
earned enough in unemployment benefi ts and that the three-year re-entry ban 
would discourage even those with the most savings from participating in the VRP. 
Furthermore, those who had saved more substantial amounts should not be en-
couraged to leave because they had probably integrated well into the Spanish econ-
omy and society (Del Barrio 2008). Both labour unions and migrant organisations 
also agreed that the Spanish government should encourage investment in migrants’ 
homelands to provide migrants with durable employment opportunities following 
their return. Alternatively – the labour unions claimed – the Spanish government 
should facilitate migrants’ settlement given how much they had contributed to the 
Spanish economic boom. 
Employers who depended on foreign workers preferred the government not to 
incentivise migrants to leave or curb new admissions. They claimed that any unex-
pected decrease in labour supply would penalise Spanish businesses without nec-
essarily helping the Spanish unemployed. Farmers and growers argued that, they 
continued to fi nd it diffi cult to attract Spanish workers despite the economic crisis 
(El Mundo 2008a). 
4.5 Initial results: weak interest except among Latin Americans
When the Ministry of Labour launched the APRE programme on 12 November 2008, 
there were over 138 thousand unemployed foreigners in the country who met the 
programme criteria and could theoretically repatriate. However, the Ministry did not 
take into consideration the attitudes of employers, migrants and the countries of 
origin. Even if those attitudes had been taken into consideration, it would have been 
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diffi cult to predict the number of returnees as the attitudes of migrants, employers 
and the countries of origin have been changing. 
According to the Ministry of Labour’s calculations, 2,191 persons (including fam-
ily members) were subsidised to leave through the humanitarian-based VRPs, 2,171 
through APRE and 99 through the investment-based VRPs between January and 
September 2010. The pace of return appeared to slow down in 2010 as compared to 
2009, when 4,022 persons left Spain through humanitarian-based VRPs and 4,365 
through APRE (MTAS 2010). 
Based on the Ministry of Labour’s 2009-2010 data, some 90 % of all those who re-
patriated through the humanitarian VRP returned to Latin America, primarily Bolivia 
(24 %, 1,520), Argentina (15 %, 941) and Brazil (12.6 %, 788). Romanians constituted 
the largest non-American nationality (1.8 %, 115) (MTAS 2010). Latin Americans also 
accounted for the largest group in the investment and unemployment-based VRPs. 
Bolivians accounted for a quarter of all returnees for investment, but none in the 
APRE programme, due to their inability to meet APRE’s conditions (legal status and 
entitlement to unemployment benefi ts). 
According to the Ministry of Labour, by 27 May 2010 – nineteen months into the 
programme – 7,087 persons had applied for APRE (Table 2). Roughly three-quarters 
were approved and returned home; 1,691 (23 %) were rejected due to incomplete or 
erroneous applications or awaiting decision. According to the Spanish Employment 
Services, the medium voluntary return bonus amounted to €  9035, 81 per migrant 
as of 3 June 2009, indicating that those migrants who used the programme applied 
soon after becoming unemployed.
The Ministry of Labour’s data shows that no Moroccan or other African had ben-
efi ted from the unemployment-based VRP-APRE until 27 May 2010. Over 99 % of 
returnees originated from Latin America, principally Ecuador, which accounted for 
45 % of returnees (Table 2). It appears that socio-economic and political conditions 
Tab. 2: Provisional results of the Ministry of Labour’s (APRE) Programme
  11 November 2008-27 May 2010
Country Applications filed Applications approved 
Ecuador 3,251 2,509 
Colombia 1,315 982 
Argentina 810 609 
Peru 483 365 
Brazil 440 325 
Uruguay 311 251 
Chile 358 268 
Other 119 87 
Total 7,087 5,396 
 
Source: Personal communication with Adela Morales del Olmo, Ministry of Labour, 27 
May 2010.
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in the country of origin and the degree of cooperation between the country of origin 
and Spain are among the factors explaining the divergent trend between returns to 
Morocco and Ecuador. The onset of political instability in Northern Africa, coupled 
with the recovery of the Spanish economy by the spring of 2011, made further re-
turns to Africa even more unlikely. Legal status did not seem to play a signifi cant 
role because there were more unemployed Moroccan workers in Spain entitled to 
unemployment benefi ts than Ecuadorians and other Latin Americans. 
The numbers of those availing themselves of an IOM-managed voluntary return 
from Spain grew rapidly until the onset of the crisis, but appeared to slow down 
afterwards, as if migrants expected it to be more diffi cult to return to Spain in the 
future. However, the decrease in returns could have also been precipitated by the 
discontinuation of the IOM-managed voluntary returns from Madrid and Catalonia 
(Table 3) due to budgetary constraints as well as reduced admissions (IOM 2010d). 
The number of migrants who returned home with the assistance of the Spanish 
IOM grew over the years until 2008. It declined afterwards due to a lack of funds (Ta-
ble 4). All in all, 5,537 people have benefi ted from IOM voluntary return assistance 
since the programme’s inception in 2003, particularly Bolivians who accounted for 
over a quarter of all returnees. By contrast, no Moroccans returned home through-
out the entire programme duration. Unlike Ecuador, Bolivia did not implement any 
special incentives for the migrants to return home and economic conditions in Bo-
livia remained diffi cult, suggesting that those Bolivians who returned could have 
been in genuinely precarious conditions while in Spain. High return rates among 
Brazilians and Argentineans could be explained by the relatively good economic, 
social and political conditions at home. 
When compared with the overall fi gures on migration outfl ows, voluntary returns 
were relatively modest, this being due to a large extent to departures by migrants 
who could not or did not want to avail themselves of subsidised return (Table 5). 
Over 288,000 departures were registered in Spain in 2009. The statistics on migra-
tion outfl ows must however be treated with a certain caution as they also include 
Tab. 3: Number of IOM-assisted returnees, by programme, 2003-June 2010
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
APRE - - - - - 110 199 142 451 
PREVIE 199 393 392 397 531 1,076 591 271 3,850 
PREVICAM - - - 60 573 210 0 0 843 
PREVICAT - - - 85 142 179 361 169 936 
PREVIVAL - - - - 22 17 0 0 39 
Total 199 393 392 542 1,268 1,592 1,151 582 6,119 
Source: Personal communication with Paloma Sevillano, IOM Madrid, 18 November 
2010.
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those third country nationals who left Spain more than once throughout the year. 
They also included those who were expelled, some 26,000 per year throughout the 
2000s (EMN 2009: 18). Moroccans were the largest group among those who were 
removed from Spain by force (EMN 2009: 19). 
5 Short-term versus long-term policy solutions
5.1 Voluntary Return Policies’ strengths and weaknesses 
The Spanish VRP has its strengths and weaknesses. The major strengths of the 
Spanish VRP have been immediacy, administrative simplicity, budget-friendliness 
and openness to modifi cation. Launched within three months of the major increase 
in unemployment, the programme provided delay-free return assistance to those 
Tab. 4: The principal ten nationalities of migrants who returned with IOM 
assistance, 2003-2009 (APRE, PREVIE, PREVICAM, PREVICAT, 
PREVIVAL)
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Bolivia 12 54 77 105 466 474 273 1,461 
Argentina 19 32 43 76 123 216 154 663 
Brazil 3 15 26 61 164 193 117 579 
Ecuador 103 153 39 40 37 106 93 571 
Chile 7 14 36 51 64 76 116 364 
Uruguay 9 20 50 46 40 90 107 362 
Colombia 19 36 31 20 37 39 66 248 
Romania 7 25 15 28 64 73 17 229 
Honduras 0 4 16 25 88 50 43 226 
Paraguay 0 10 13 9 37 54 51 174 
Others 20 30 46 81 148 221 114 660 
Total 199 393 392 542 1,268 1,592 1,151 5,537 
Source: Personal correspondence with Carmen Penalba from IOM Madrid, 26 October 
2010.
Tab. 5: Migration outfl ows from Spain, 2002-2009 (in thousands)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Departures 6.9 10 41.9 48.7 120.3 199 232 288.3 
Source: OECD 2011: 344.
•    Piotr Plewa168
migrants who were certain that they wanted to leave Spain. If a majority of Spanish 
immigrants decided to depart shortly after being laid off, the programme would be 
likely to keep unemployment pressures and anti-immigrant sentiments down. The 
simple design, consisting of verifi cation of eligibility for unemployment benefi ts, 
favours fast processing of applications. Since migrants have earned their departure 
bonuses through social security payments, the only major cost of the programme 
concerns the provision of free transportation, part of which could be reimbursed to 
Spain from the EU’s voluntary return fund.
The three-year return ban has been the programme’s strength and weakness. 
It is likely to prevent the return of those who have not been able to integrate them-
selves into Spanish society. However, those few who will be under pressure to re-
enter Spain before the three years elapse will have to do so illegally. 
Given that some of the weaknesses have already emerged, it may not be long 
before the Spanish VRP undergoes modifi cation. Even though Spain implemented 
its very fi rst VRP as early as 2003, the policy has never been analysed despite the 
wealth of information revealed by the Western European VRPs since the late 1970s 
and Spain’s own experience since 2003. Wishing for the VRP to provide an immedi-
ate response to the crisis, Spanish offi cials have also neglected to consult about 
the programme with the countries of origin and social actors. Both domestic and 
international actors would most likely have cooperated. However, they would have 
preferred returns to be spread out in time so as to permit all parties involved to 
make the necessary adjustments: namely for employers to switch to less labour-
intensive production; for migrants to sell any property acquired in Spain and make 
post-return employment and housing arrangements; for the countries of origin to 
prepare labour and housing markets for migrant repatriation.
The low-cost character of the Spanish VRP was also its weakness. The VRPs pre-
dating APRE run out of funds. Linked to the accumulated unemployment insurance 
benefi ts, APRE did not appeal to employed spouses of unemployed migrants, mi-
grant children and those who have not accumulated large unemployment benefi ts. 
Furthermore, it alienated the undecided candidates, as the longer they mused over 
the departure decision, the smaller the departure bonuses became to which they 
were entitled. Most importantly, the homelands bemoaned the lack of additional 
funds that would allow migrants to start business at home. 
When designing the programme, Spanish offi cials counted on the immediate de-
parture of entire families, preferably nationals of the most impoverished countries, 
so as to diminish the likelihood that they would remain to work for substandard 
wages. However, the current programme design and the response of the countries 
of origin are likely to attract single returnees from relatively developed countries.
5.2 VRPs in the context of a broader migration policy 
Thirty-fi ve years since the fi rst VRPs were implemented in Europe, it is still uncer-
tain to what extent they can stimulate returns, and to what degree they can sub-
sidise the departures of those who were going to return anyway. Having realised 
this challenge in the 1980s, the French invested considerable funds and efforts to 
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increase migrants’ incentives to repatriate. By contrast, the Dutch considered that 
VRPs contradicted integration policy and downplayed them. Given the low level 
of effectiveness of VRPs in the 1980s in terms of the proportion of migrants who 
returned, the programmes were phased out until they were advocated anew in the 
1990s and 2000s under the assumption that they could help European countries 
deal with the rising entries of asylum-seekers and with irregular migration. 
There is a trade-off between VRPs’ costs and effectiveness. VRPs tend to be 
particularly costly when they aim to reintegrate migrants abroad since successful 
reintegration requires adequate economic, social and political stability in migrants’ 
countries of origin and systematic post-return assistance. However, the stronger 
the reintegration prospects, the more likely it is that migrants will genuinely want to 
return home. 
As implied by their name, voluntary return assistance programmes aim to be vol-
untary. However, few are implemented in a context in which migrants can choose 
between voluntary returns and other equally enticing alternatives. In a number of 
cases, those who avail themselves of VRPs are those who are already in an irregular 
status or about to enter it (e.g. rejected asylum-seekers), and their only alternative is 
repatriation by force. In those cases, VRPs are not genuinely voluntary and migrants 
are likely to avoid them or re-emigrate following their return home.
While VRPs can complement other, more complex policy measures, they can-
not substitute them because VRPs are not designed to address the root causes 
of migration (the lack of economic, political and social stability in the countries of 
origin and the demand for cheap manual labour in Europe). Thus, if the countries 
which currently strongly promote VRPs – such as Spain – wish to bring genuine 
relief to migrants, their policymakers should consider implementing four measures 
aimed at improving the working and living conditions of those migrants who cannot 
return immediately. Firstly, they should facilitate labour mobility to those migrants 
who can earn it. Secondly, they should clarify employer duties regarding working 
and living conditions and verify them, to prevent that settled migrants are granted 
contracts on condition that they accept substandard wages or fl exible schedules, 
lack of housing, etc. Thirdly, they should subsidise the rationalisation, mechanisa-
tion and off-shoring of production in labour-intensive sectors so that employers will 
reduce demand for labour as migrants move to better jobs in two or three years’ 
time. Fourthly, they should strengthen development policies for the countries of 
origin to reduce emigration pressure. Whilst some of these recommendations may 
be easier to implement than others, they are both politically and logistically feasi-
ble as they build on the policies already implemented in most European countries, 
including Spain. 
Since there will always be some migrants who do not want to return and who are 
diffi cult to repatriate for humanitarian or administrative reasons, they should be of-
fered a channel through which they can earn their way to full integration in the Span-
ish labour market and society. One way of making VRP money more productive 
would be to grant the settled migrants an option to invest and create jobs in Spain. 
Migrant businesses created in Spain would be easier to mentor than businesses 
created in the countries of origin. They could benefi t from much better infrastruc-
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ture and therefore would be more likely to survive. Furthermore, policies helping to 
promote migrants as job-givers rather than job-takers are likely to gain public sup-
port and improve migrants’ integration into the Spanish society. The countries of 
origin would probably not oppose giving their nationals the option to invest in Spain 
because of their own limited reception and employment-creation capacities and the 
need for an uninterrupted fl ow of remittances. One important challenge to success-
ful post-return development funds has been the lack of infrastructure to support 
investment and economic, political or social instability in the countries of origin. 
Investing in Spain would help to overcome these challenges even in the context of 
the economic crisis. However, special measures would have to be put in place so 
that migrant businesses do not pave the way for ethnicisation of the labour market 
and further expansion in the number of precarious jobs.
The less entrepreneurial foreign settlers may prefer to seek employer-dependent 
jobs. The economic crisis has not affected all sectors to the same extent. Even in 
the midst of the crisis, the unaffected sectors may fi nd it diffi cult to attract Spanish 
workers. The Spanish government’s authorisation of farmers to bring new foreign 
workers while repatriating those already in Spain, claiming that the repatriated in-
dividuals are unable to fi nd jobs, is incoherent. If granted full labour mobility, many 
of Spain’s foreign workers would most likely be willing to move to jobs which Span-
ish workers are not willing to take, e.g. in agriculture or domestic services. Instead 
of allowing those sectors to continue to recruit new workers abroad, the Spanish 
government should encourage them to contract with unemployed foreign workers 
already in Spain. 
It would be unrealistic to expect foreign workers, who take the most labour-
intensive jobs in the context of the crisis, to want to perform these diffi cult tasks 
forever. Furthermore, it would also be unrealistic to expect the most labour-inten-
sive jobs to survive in an economy with relatively high labour costs. But as long 
as migrant workers who cannot repatriate are allowed to take those jobs, they will 
protect themselves from unemployment and acquire the skills necessary to stay in 
the sector as it transforms to less-labour intensive production. 
The transformation to less labour-intensive production should improve working 
conditions in many jobs that migrants tend to take. During the 1990s, Spanish ag-
riculture relied heavily on migrant workers to do the jobs that even migrants them-
selves were abandoning as soon as opportunities in less strenuous jobs came up. 
As foreign worker admissions were made more diffi cult in the early 2000s, and as 
more employers invested in labour-saving production methods, the sector adjusted 
to more rigorous admission rules and the employed migrants enjoyed better work-
ing conditions and incentives to stay and maintain legal status.
The Spanish government should assist the transformation from more to less 
labour-intensive production in order to reduce demand for jobs at the bottom of the 
social scale and to protect migrant workers from falling into illegality. Specifi cally, 
it could provide the fi nancial, legal and technical support necessary for employers 
to rationalise, mechanise and, where necessary, engage in “offshore” production, 
so as to reduce demand for labour in jobs that locally-available (native or resident 
foreign) workers do not want to take up.
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While production “off-shoring” may seem like the most controversial and dif-
fi cult to carry out in practice, it deserves consideration given that it is more likely 
to engage the sending and receiving countries in comprehensive cooperation than 
was the case with projects aimed to use migrants’ savings for job creation in their 
homelands in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Turkish returnees from Germany 
found that the sites for the new plants and the technologies to be used were often 
not optimum and Turkish law did not accommodate their projects. The requirement 
that founding capital be deposited in Turkish rather than foreign currency made 
entrepreneurs susceptible to infl ation. Although 223 companies were functioning in 
the early 1980s, only 28 were operating at more than 69 % capacity. With approxi-
mately 15,000 jobs created, most of the 345,000 shareholders could not expect to 
fi nd employment (Rogers 1997: 161). More importantly, the wages paid for those 
jobs were below what most returning migrants would have found acceptable. Only 
a handful of companies paid dividends. By the end of the 1980s, many shares were 
being bought up by banks and large companies (Rogers 1997: 162).
In line with the circular migration agenda, the EU plans to open job centres in 
the most emigration-prone areas in Africa. It has not been clear whether such job 
centres would recruit workers to Europe or help workers to secure better jobs in the 
countries of origin. The fi nancial crisis has slowed the expansion of foreign worker 
admissions to Europe. Given the controversies over whether job centres recruiting 
people to work in Europe would promote development in Africa or rather make Af-
rica more dependent on jobs in Europe; one positive effect of the economic crisis 
may be that it will favour investment in Africa.
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